INTRODUCTION
Appellate decisions generally consist of two elements-the resolution of a dispute and a statement of law explaining that resolution. ' The former can only be retroactive-a judge cannot resolve a case before it arises. Prospectivity and retroactivity only present issues with respect to the general explanatory statements of law. Because the more general statements are a court's best explanation of the legal rules governing certain facts, they ought to apply to other cases based on the same kinds of facts arising both before and after the judgment.
To the extent that a court creates or changes a rule of law in a given case and then applies it to other cases based on past conduct, it * Wallace Stevens Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. This is a substantially abridged version of the United States report submitted for the topic, "Judicial Rulings with Prospective Effect" at the XIXth International Congress of Comparative Law, 2014. Scott Garosshen provided essential research and editorial assistance.
regulates that conduct by a retroactive rule. This raises immediate alarms. In American law, as in most law, retroactive rules are disfavored. The United States Supreme Court expressed the prevailing attitude:
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal. Several provisions of the Unites States Constitution are motivated, at least in part, by concerns about the evils of retroactive law 3 and American courts interpreting legislation indulge a strong presumption against retroactivity. 4 The attitude, however, is quite the opposite when it comes to the judgments of courts. The strong presumption is that statements of law in judgments that announce new rules or overturn old ones apply to conduct predating that judgment. This seeming inconsistency derives from the "declaratory" theory of adjudication-legislatures make new law but courts only find and declare pre-existing law. 5 Blackstone, whose influence on American law was great, understood judgments as merely "the principal and most authoritative evidence" of a law with a prior and independent existence. 6 Courts engage in interpretive not creative acts. 7 Joseph Story, a preeminent early American legal authority, embraced this idea with enthusiasm. Legal rules, he claimed, were "antecedent" to judicial decisions and the latter were valuable only for "their supposed conformity to those rules." (citations omitted)).
3. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3 (federal); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (states) (no ex post facto laws); art I, § 9, cl. 3 (federal); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (states) (no bills of attainder); art I, § 10, cl. 1(states)(no impairment of the obligation of contracts); amend. V (federal) (no taking of property without just compensation); amends. V (federal), XIV (states) (no deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law).
4. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265.
5.
See, e.g., Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908 (1985) (Courts do not "bring new laws into being," but provide "readings or renditions of the meaning implicit in some independently existing, external object."). [Vol. 62 lature have only prospective effect while those announced by judges have retroactive effect as well. 9 Modern jurisprudence, of course, has largely debunked this view and has recognized an inevitable law-making power in courts. 10 It might follow that the retroactivity of rules arising from adjudication is as worrisome as that associated with legislation. That is, we should expect cases in which people have acted in substantial and reasonable reliance on the law that preceded introduction of the "new rule" by a court. In such cases, it might make sense to apply new judicial rules, like new legislative rules, only to the future. So, when, in 1848, the Ohio Supreme Court held legislative divorces unconstitutional, it recognized that "second marriages [had] been contracted" based on such divorces and retroactive application of its decision would "bastardize" the children born of those marriages. It was enough that the court had declared the correct state of the law. It felt "confident that no department of state has any disposition to violate it, and that the evil will cease""
Joseph Story, Value and Importance of Legal Studies, in THE MISCELLANEOUS
In the early twentieth century, as the force of the declaratory theory began to wane, this idea of limiting judgments' effect to future transactions was increasingly proposed as a reasonable approach when courts created new legal rules and especially when they overruled established precedent. In 1921, Chief Judge (as he then was) Benjamin Cardozo noted that in some cases:
when the hardship [of the retroactive effect of judge-made law] is felt to be too great or to be unnecessary, retrospective operation is withheld ....
It may be hard to square such a ruling with abstract dogmas and definitions. When so much else that a court does, is done with retroactive force, why draw the line here? The answer is, I think, that the line is drawn here, because the injustice and oppression of a refusal to draw it would be so great as to be intolerable.' 2 9. Similarly, the constitutional provisions that prohibit retroactive laws generally have been held inapplicable to judicial acts. See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. In 1932, the constitutionality of such "prospective overruling" was challenged in the United States Supreme Court.' 4 The Montana Supreme Court had previously held that when the Montana Railroad Commission reversed its prior determination of freight charges' reasonableness, shippers could recover the excess amounts paid under the earlier dispensation. The Montana court overruled that interpretation but applied the old rule to the parties before it, allowing the shipper to recover the unreasonable charges.' 5 The railroad argued that this deprived it of property without due process of law because it had been forced to refund the payments based on an interpretation of the statute now acknowledged to be wrong.'
6 In Great Northern Railway. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., the Supreme Court rejected this argument in a unanimous decision written by now Justice Cardozo. A state court was entitled to "make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions."' 7 The "declaratory" understanding of adjudication was merely one of several permissible approaches:
The choice for any state may be determined by the juristic philosophy of the judges of her courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and nature .... [W] e may say of the earlier decision that it has not been overruled at all. It has been translated into a judgment of affirmance and recognized as law anew. Accompanying the recognition is a prophecy, which may or may not be realized in conduct, that transactions arising in the future will be governed by a different rule .... [W] e are not at liberty, for anything contained in the constitution of the United States, to thrust upon those courts a different conception either of the binding force of precedent or of the meaning of the judicial process.'
This decision put to rest any constitutional concerns with state courts' prospective judgments. [Vol. 62
The balance of this report will examine how courts have responded to this possibility and will attempt to summarize the state of the law. This attempt is complicated by the federal character of the jurisdiction. The relevant law is often different from state to state. My summary account of state law, therefore, must be more indicative than definitive. In addition, I will describe the same issues in federal law-the law of the United States. Although it will be apparent that the division is in some ways artificial, I will also divide the treatment between judgments of civil law and criminal law.
II. PROSPECTIVE JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL LAW

A. State Courts
Statements of law contained in a judgment are presumed to apply to events predating that judgment. The negative impact of this retroactive application of judicially created rules must be substantial before a court will consider limiting the rules to future cases. When deciding whether to depart from the default of full retroactivity, the foremost consideration is the nature and degree of likely reliance on the prior state of the law. This consideration "can hardly be overemphasized."
19 Courts view some fields of law-such as contract and property-as especially likely to induce such reliance. Apart from the injustice of erasing or devaluing rights deemed to have already "vested" in their holders, 20 these are fields where individuals may have actually paid attention to existing rules of law, perhaps even consulted legal advisers, before engaging in a given transaction. By contrast, new rules of tort law seldom upset significant reliance interests. "Ordinarily," for example, "persons who drive carelessly do not do so in conscious reliance upon some rule of law." 2 2
The scope of tort liability, however, may affect some decisions on whether and how much insurance a party obtains, as well as the decision to investigate an incident for which it might be held liable. Therefore, courts often made their decisions eliminating tort immu-nity for municipalities and charitable institutions prospective-only.
3
Notably, in calculating the reliance that justifies making judicial decisions non-retroactive, courts almost always consider categories of cases; not the presence or absence of reliance by the particular parties before the court.
4
Whenever prospective operation is suggested there are necessarily competing considerations. Retroactive application might undermine reasonable actions taken in reliance on the former law. But the new judgment, by definition, supposes the altered rule to be superior to the old one. Prospective-only operation, therefore, entails a decision to apply an inferior rule to prior transactions. In accommodating the relevant factors, many state courts have settled on some variation of a test formulated by the United States Supreme Court in its 1971 decision in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson. 25 The test considers three factors: 1) whether the decision to be applied non-retroactively establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent or by deciding an issue of first impression; 2) if, in light the new rule's purpose and effect, retrospective operation would further or retard its operation; and 3) the extent of the inequity imposed by retroactive application, namely the injustice or hardship that would be caused by retroactive application.
6
A court examines these factors, it must be stressed, against the background presumption that retroactivity is "overwhelmingly the norm." 27 Thus a litigant seeking prospective-only application must firmly convince a court that each factor favors such a decision. [Vol. 62
Once we have established that a court may limit the retroactive application of its judgment, other questions arise. Such a decision might mean that the new rule is to apply only to primary conduct occurring after the date the decision is announced and to no conduct occurring before that date. While that is sometimes the case, there are other possibilities. A court might make a new norm partly retroactive, applying it to some but not all past events. For example, when the Connecticut Supreme Court expanded an enterprise's "slip and fall" tort liability to include injuries caused by a foreseeably unsafe "mode of operation," it applied its holding to "all future cases and, as a general rule, to all previously filed cases in which the trial has not yet commenced .... ,"2s The court apparently concluded that the costs of adjusting to the new rule would not be excessive if litigation had not yet reached the trial stage.
The simple approach of starting the rule running, at the moment of decision, has, for reasons which will become apparent, been labeled "pure prospectivity." Neither the litigant in the case announcing the new rule, nor any other person whose claim is based on prior events, will be subject to that rule. 29 Since the new rule plays no role in determining the outcome of the litigation, it is technically dicta and, as such, communicates only a prediction of what the law will be. 30 A court might even postpone the moment that the rule becomes applicable to some date further in the future. This variation has been called "prospective-prospective overruling." A court may reason that parties affected by the new rule need additional time to adjust their behavior. So, when the Wisconsin Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability on June 5, 1962, it held the "effective date of the abolition of the rule" would be July 15, 1962 in order "Lt~o enable the various public bodies to make financial arrangements to meet the new liability." 3 1 When later, the same year, the Minnesota Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion, it expressed its "intention to overrule the doctrine ... with respect to tort claims . . . arising after the next Minnesota Legislature adjourns, subject to any statutes which now or hereafter limit or regulate the 33 It is, in part, motivated by a desire to connect a judgment's statements of law to the particular controversy before the court. 34 More prominent is the worry that not granting the benefit of the new rule to the party arguing for it in the case in which it is announced would discourage other litigants from advancing claims that would change existing law. It would, therefore, deprive the legal system of the law-reform benefits deriving from judicial consideration of those claims.
3 5 Critics have questioned this premise. The fact that courts maintain retroactive application in the great majority of cases is enough to motivate most litigants. Some parties, moreover, will have a continuing interest in the legal rule so that even if they fail to benefit in the first case, they will profit from its adoption in future ones.
36
In addition to doubts about its incentive effect, critics of selective prospectivity emphasize the inevitable resulting inequity. 37 The best known example is the 1959 decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District 302.38 The plaintiff was one of fourteen schoolchildren suffering burns and other injuries when, due to the negligence of its driver, a school bus struck a culvert and exploded. 39 The Supreme Court used the case to reconsider and abolish the tort immunity of school districts. 40 Since, however, retrospective application of the decision would work a hardship on school districts that may have failed to secure adequate insurance or to investigate prior accidents on the assumption they could not be held [Vol. 62 responsible for them, it decided that the new liability would apply only in "cases arising out of future occurrences." It made an exception, however, for "the plaintiff in the instant case." 41 The unattractive consequences of this solution became apparent when seven other children hurt in the same accident-including three of the first plaintiffs siblings-sought relief. 42 The trial court, relying on the Supreme Court's explicit exception for only "the plaintiff in the instant case," dismissed the other complaints. The Supreme Court reversed since it "now appears the [first] appeal was treated by [all] the parties as a test case .... "-43 The facts of this litigation highlight the arbitrary quality of selective prospectivity. The Court's second decision eliminated the inequity for those involved in the same accident but left in place the different treatment accorded every other victim of municipal negligence who was injured before the date of the first decision.
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B. Federal Courts
Despite these concerns, most state courts maintain the option of non-retroactivity. The situation in federal courts is more complicated. After an initial period of infrequent and unreflective use of non-retroactivity, the United States Supreme Court systematized its approach in 1971 by articulating the three-factor Chevron Oil test cited above for deciding whether to apply a judgment non-retroactively. Then, in the early 1990s, the Supreme Court reversed course and held that federal courts must always apply their judgments retroactively. The following is a brief summary of that evolution.
A set of cases in the nineteenth century recognized-indeed, appeared to require-non-retroactive application of judge-made changes in state law insofar as that law was applied in federal court litigation founded on "diversity jurisdiction," providing a federal forum where the parties to a controversy resided in different states. )-discussed at supra note 28-that an expanded rule of tort liability would apply only to future cases and "previously filed cases in which trial ha [d] not commenced" on the date of decision. In Humphrey, the Court agreed that the new rule should also apply to cases where trial had begun and the plaintiffhad raised at trial the same claim as that later adopted in Kelly. The Court was unwilling to sustain differences occasioned by the happenstance that one case had reached it before the other. Humphrey, 993 A.2d at 453.
45. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
their own federal common law' 46 but deferred to state courts' interpretations of enacted state law, i.e. statutes and constitutions. In an 1847 diversity case, appealed from the federal court in Mississippi, however, the Supreme Court decided to defer only prospectively to the state court's interpretations of enacted state law. 47 The Supreme Court had previously held, in the absence of any state court interpretation on point, that a provision of the Mississippi constitution prohibiting the sale of slaves was ineffective without state implementing legislation. After the contract at issue had been made, however, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held the provision selfexecuting. 48 The United States Supreme Court agreed that federal courts should conform to state court interpretations "from the time they are made. But we ought not to give them a retroactive effect, and allow them to render invalid contracts entered into with citizens of other States, which in the judgment of this court were lawfully made." 49 The dissenting opinion highlighted the anomaly of such a holding, arguing that it "gives to the Constitution of Mississippi different meanings at different periods of its existence . . . ."5 The majority's approach was followed in several other federal diversity cases dealing with the validity of bonds issued by local governments under an authority that had first been confirmed by decisions of the state courts but subsequently denied under changed interpretations of state constitutions. 5 1 The underlying concern about the unfairness of retroactive decisions evident in these cases, as well as in the state court decisions already canvassed, also surfaced in connection with federal court judgments applying federal law. On three occasions in the 1960s, perhaps influenced by its decisions refusing to apply new rules of criminal procedure retroactively, 5 2 the Supreme Court gave its holdings only prospective effect. 5 issue of prospectivity in depth.5 4 The plaintiff had sustained a personal injury while at work on Chevron's off-shore drilling platform. Recovery for such claims was governed by a federal statute, the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act, which specified no statute of limitations. Most courts that had addressed the issue had held that the limitations period was controlled by the equitable doctrine of laches.
5
Then, in a 1969 decision, after Huson had filed his complaint, the Supreme Court rejected those cases and interpreted the Act to borrow the neighboring state's personal injury limitations period.
5 6 For Huson, that was Louisiana and its one year statute of limitations barred his claim. 57 The Court held, however, that its 1969 decision "should not be invoked to require application of the Louisiana time limitation retroactively to [Huson] ."5s It went on to elaborate the three criteria already mentioned: (i) the rule had to be genuinely new; (ii) retroactive application was not necessary to further the operation of that rule; and (iii) retroactivity "could produce substantial inequitable results."
5 9 In this case, each factor favored prospective-only application.
6 0 Eight Justices joined the opinion. 6 1 As already noted, the Chevron Oil test soon became the standard way of deciding prospectivity questions in state courts. Three decisions in the early 1990s, however, rejected the Chevron Oil test in federal courts. By this time, the Supreme Court, as will be discussed below, had retreated from the idea that it could limit the retroactive effect of decisions creating new constitutional rules of criminal procedure.
6 3 Each decision addressed whether taxpayers were entitled to a refund of state taxes paid under a statute later held unconstitutional. In the first, the Supreme Court held that taxpayers were not entitled to a full refund.
6 4 Four justices applied the Chevron Oil test, observing that state authorities had reasonably supposed the taxes valid when imposed and that refunds "could deplete the state treasury [and] 
,,6
The Court denied the refunds because the ninth judge, Justice Scalia, believed the state tax in question had been and continued to be constitutional. 6 8 But he made clear that he agreed with the dissenters on prospectivity. "Since the Constitution does not change from year to year; since it does not conform to our decisions, but our decisions are supposed to conform to it; the notion that our interpretation of the Constitution in a particular decision could take prospective form does not make sense." 6 9
The writing was now on the wall. The next year, in the second unconstitutional state tax case, the Court issued five separate opinions, none with the support of more than three justices. But again there were five votes for the proposition that, when the Court decided a constitutional issue and applied it to the parties at bar, it must apply that holding to any other cases still open.
7 0 Finally, in the third case, the Court produced a single majority opinion expressing the new understanding:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule .... .1
Although it expressed a view of adjudication hostile to any form of non-retroactivity, the majority opinion forbade only "selective prospectivity," in which a court applies the new rule to the parties before it but not to other conduct predating the court's judgment. It did not, therefore, overrule Chevron Oil, which was an instance of "pure prospectivity" since the plaintiff had been given the benefit of the previous limitations period. 7 The Supreme Court's decisions retreating from prospective judgments show the influence of the factors already discussed that have worried courts and commentators about the practice. A central complaint was its deviation from the judicial role. This concern reflected, at some level, the Blackstonian view of adjudication. It was most explicit in the separate opinions of Justice Scalia. Closely related to this was possible violation of the constitutional imperative that federal courts adjudicate only real "cases or controversies."
7 5 It has been argued that this precludes a federal court pronouncing on a legal issue unnecessary to resolve the dispute at bar.
7 6 This argument is doubtful as a matter of constitutional interpretation, 7 7 but the Supreme Court had appeared to accept it in an earlier criminal procedure case in which it had declined to apply a new rule retroactively though it conceded that it had applied it to the parties in the case first announcing it. In that first case, however, retroactive application was an "unavoidable consequence of the necessity that constitutional adjudications not stand as mere dictum [and oil Is] ound policies of decision-making, rooted in the command of Article III of the Constitution that we resolve issues solely in concrete cases or controversies .... ,,7
If the limits of constitutional federal jurisdiction obliged a federal court to apply a new rule to the party in the case announcing it, then the only kind of prospectivity available to it was "selective prospectivity." The Supreme Court, however, became unwilling to accept the inequity of making the applicability of a rule turn solely on which litigant happened to reach the Court first. Simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule constitute an indefensible departure from this model of judicial review. 8 0 These arguments, which had already convinced a majority of the Court in the field of criminal procedure, ultimately led to a policy of "full retroactivity" in the adjudication of federal civil cases.,'
It is important to remember that the development just traced is applicable only to changes in federal law. In Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 7 bondholders whose rights had been reduced under a federal statute subsequently declared unconstitutional sought to recover the full amount originally due. The Supreme Court noted that a 1936 District Court proceeding-in which the validity of the governing law was not raised-had confirmed the prior adjustment and had never been appealed.
8 8 The law's constitutionality was thus res judicata and could not be raised in a collateral proceeding. 9 As the Court put it in a later case, "the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case."
90
The limits of retroactivity are grounded in strong practical policy. "A contrary rule," as one state court noted, "would produce chaos in the legal system, as judgments could be continually opened and reopened with every fluctuation in the law." 9 1 A nineteenth century Supreme Court decision put the matter powerfully:
IT]he maintenance of public order, the repose of society, and the quiet of families, require that what has been definitely determined by competent tribunals shall be accepted as irrefragable legal truth. So deeply is this principle implanted in [our] jurisprudence, that commentators upon it have said, that res judicata renders white that which is black, and straight that which is crooked.
92
The policy of finality in civil litigation, however, is not absolute. In rare cases, parties may collaterally attack otherwise final judgments-but only if the case is truly exceptional. Section 73(2) of the Restatement states that a judgment "may be set aside or modified if . . . "Itihere has been such a substantial change in the circumstances that giving continued effect to the judgment is unjust." Noting that this principle has sometimes been applied to cases where a later decision changed the law applied in an earlier, unrelated judgment, however, Comment (c) to this section labels such decisions "a misinterpretation of the rule and a very unsound policy." 93 Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifies five grounds for "relief from a final judgment" none of which speak directly to a change in the governing law. A sixth refers to "any other reason that justifies relief." The rare cases in which the Supreme Court has considered applying Rule 60(b)(6) in connection with a change in the law are inconclusive. 9 4 One judge has described Rule 60(b)(6) jurisprudence as showing "a strong current of unwillingness to reopen judgments but with some wriggle room for future arguments." 95 Still, other lower federal courts have referred to the rule as "a grand reservoir of equitable power," 96 and have assumed that an "intervening change of controlling law" may justify exercising it. practice, this kind of relief is very unusual. Whenever courts note the possibility of modifying a final judgment, they always stress the need to show particularly compelling reasons. Notwithstanding the occasional exception, it is fair to say that the presumptive-and in federal courts nearly compulsory-retroactive effect of civil judgments reaches back only to controversies still open to judicial resolution. At some point adjudication comes to an end and unsuccessful civil litigants are denied the solace of newer and friendlier law.
In criminal cases, where a defendant remains in custody, however, the finality of a conviction is not so unqualified. The continuing possibility of collateral attack has been critical in shaping the law of the retroactivity and prospectivity of judicial decisions. This is the subject of the next section. 93 . RESTATEMENT [Vol. 62
III. PROSPECTIVE JUDGMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW
A. Substantive Liability
Discomfort with retroactive law has been most acute in connection with retroactive criminal liability. The United States Constitution explicitly prohibits all ex post facto criminal laws. 98 The values underlying these worries are not entirely clear. The reliance interest, so prominent in civil prospectivity jurisprudence, may play a role if an actor is likely to consult the criminal law before acting. But criminal acts, like most tortious acts, are seldom the subject of selfconscious reliance on the law. 9 9 The objection to ex post facto criminality seems premised on some more rudimentary sense of fairness.' 0 0
The Supreme Court has held that the constitutional limitation on "ex post facto laws" refers only to legislation; not to judicial acts.
10 1 This presents few problems when judicial action contracts the scope of criminal behavior. When a criminal statute is held unconstitutional, even a final judgment of conviction is deemed void and may be subject to collateral attack. 0 2 More serious issues arise when courts interpret criminal law to reach acts that appeared lawful when committed. Such cases seem to raise problems identical to those underlying the ban on ex post facto legislation. As a result, courts have tried to find ways to apply these new interpretations only prospectively.' 0 3 In State v. Jones, for example, the Supreme Court of New Mexico changed its construction of the statute forbidding lotteries. The defendants' previous conviction for holding a "bank night" promotion at a movie theater had been reversed by the Supreme Court that held that such events were not lotteries.
10 5 But when they were prosecuted a second time for the same offense, the Supreme Court rejected its former interpretation and held that bank nights were lotteries. Since, however, the defendants "did only that which this court declared, even if erroneously, to be within the law" the "plainest principles of justice" demanded that the new interpretation should be given only prospective effect. The court declared that its new view of the statute would be observed only "in cases having their origin in 98 The Supreme Court of the United States dealt with a similar problem in James v. United States, a prosecution for tax evasion based on the defendant's failure to report embezzled funds as income. 10 7 An earlier case, Commissioner v. Wilcox, had held that embezzled funds were not income for these purposes. 08 Three justices thought Wilcox continued to be good law and would have dismissed the prosecution on that basis.' 0 9 Three different justices would have overruled Wilcox and remanded for a new trial." 0 A third set of three justices would have overruled Wilcox but also dismissed this case because the existence of the Wilcox holding made it impossible to attribute to the defendant the "willfulness" necessary to sustain a conviction."' The net result of this division was that the Court overruled Wilcox but did not apply its new interpretation to the case before it or to any tax returns filed before the date of the decision." 2 It should be noted, however, that six justices in the James case rejected the idea that the Court could apply its interpretation of the criminal law prospectively only. In his separate opinion, Justice Black dismissed the idea of prospective overruling but also thought that any criminal statute so ambiguous as to be susceptible of an entirely unexpected interpretation would "raise[ I serious questions of unconstitutional vagueness."" 3 The Court applied that reasoning in Bouie v. City of Columbia." 4 The South Carolina Supreme Court had adopted a new and surprising interpretation of the state's criminal trespass law to sustain the conviction of civil rights demonstrators conducting a "sit-in" at a segregated lunch counter. 15 The United States Supreme Court held that this "unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language" was a "deprivation of the right of fair warning." Such an interpretation, if "applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law 
B. New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure
While American courts generally apply reductions in criminal liability retroactively and enlargements of that liability only prospectively, the rules governing application of changes in criminal procedure are much more complicated. In the early 1960s, the United States Supreme Court decided a number of cases dramatically enlarging the rights of criminal defendants, including the right to counsel, 1 7 to remain silent," 8 to fair procedures in identification by witnesses," 9 and to exclude improperly secured evidence.' 20 The cumulative effect has more than once been described as a "revolution."' 2 ' Judged under these new constitutional standards, many prior convictions would be invalid. During the same period, the Supreme Court also expanded the opportunities to attack a constitutionally defective state court conviction in federal court through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' The Court cited some of the civil cases discussed above in Part II for the proposition that "the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect." "[W]e must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation."' 26 Since Mapp was intended only as a "deterrent to lawless police action" its purpose would not be "advanced by making the rule retrospective." Past police misconduct could not be undone "by releasing the prisoners involved."' 27 Moreover, states' reliance on prior law was due the same respect that private reliance was given when new rules changed civil liability.' 2 8 Given the number of potential petitioners, retroactive application "would tax the administration of justice to the utmost."1 29
The Court later rephrased the proper approach in a formula:
The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicates (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.
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Linkletter itself denied retroactive application only to cases that were already final when the new rule was announced.1 3 ' In Stovall v. Denno, however, the Court held that a new rule, excluding evidence of a police-arranged eyewitness identification in the absence of counsel, would affect only confrontations occurring after the new rule had been announced.' 3 2 Thus, it would apply neither to final cases nor to some cases still open on direct review. The underlying reasons for non-retroactivity provided no basis to distinguish between final con- In subsequent cases, the Court set various effective dates for the applicability of new rules of criminal procedure. A rule excluding a defendant's statements made without adequate warnings about the right to counsel applied only to cases in which the trial began after the new rule was announced.
13 4 The holding that electronic surveillance was a "search" or "seizure" subject to the Fourth Amendment applied only to cases in which the surveillance was undertaken after the relevant judgment.'
35 New rules on permissible searches incident to arrest applied only to searches occurring after the promulgation of those rules.' 36 This era of prospectivity, however, was short-lived. Starting in the late 1960s, Justice Harlan, who had joined some of the early opinions, issued a series of powerful dissents to the Court's decisions. He objected to a perceived departure from the Court's judicial role and was especially offended by the Court's record of what we have called "selective prospectivity." Typically, the Court decided the constitutional question in one case, applying its new rule-necessarily retroactively-to the parties at bar. It only addressed the retroactivity question when another party raised it in a later case. Deciding the new rule was only prospective at that point resulted in an intolerable inequity.
37 Justice Harlan, therefore, advocated the full retroactivity of constitutional judgments for all cases not yet final in the sense that the defendants had exhausted all available appeals. The key moment for cutting off the retroactive effect of judgments announcing new constitutional rules of criminal procedure, therefore, is when a state court conviction has become "final"-i.e., when there is no further opportunity for direct appellate review either in the state courts or by writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. As in civil litigation, this point has been defended by the need to bring proceedings to some identifiable close. There must, Justice Harlan had argued, "be a visible end to the litigable aspect of the criminal process .... If law, criminal or otherwise, is worth having and enforcing, it must at some time provide a definitive answer to the question litigants present or else it never provides an answer at a1147 all." 7 Historically, however, res judicata did not shield a final criminal judgment from challenge as fully as it would a final civil judgment. [Vol. 62 forcement of the right to personal liberty .... *"149 Expressly limiting "full" retroactive application to cases still "on direct review" was, therefore, essential to avoid potentially re-opening the conviction of every defendant still in custody. Since many of the new criminal procedure rules were concededly unrelated to the merits of a prosecution, applying them retroactively to finally adjudicated convictions would result in the "wholesale release of the guilty." 15 0 If it did nothing else, this limitation imposed a quantitative limit on the resulting disruption.' 5 '
Nonetheless, refusing to apply a new rule of criminal procedure to all defendants incarcerated as a result of trials in which that rule had not been observed necessarily involved some arbitrariness. It kept "all people in jail who were unfortunate enough to have had their unconstitutional convictions affirmed before June 19, 1961."152 As the dissent was quick to point out, Linkletter had committed his offense before the defendant in Mapp, who had been released under that case's new exclusionary rule. If the courts had not delayed in resolving Linkletter's appeal, his case would have reached the Supreme Court first and he would have been released under the new exclusionary rule instead.' 5 3 "Too many irrelevant considerations," noted one commentator, "including the common cold, bear upon the rate of progress of a case through the judicial system."
Limiting the retroactive effect of new criminal procedure rules to cases on direct review has been defended not so much as a logical feature of retroactivity but as an aspect of the restricted purpose of habeas corpus in federal courts. On this account, habeas exists not to correct errors but to ensure that state courts adhere to applicable federal standards of criminal justice. For this purpose, it generally suffices that criminal prosecutions conform to the law in effect at the time of the trial. Even though a judgment is carefully and plausibly explained as an application of existing law, it may still be a "new rule." It qualifies, according to a later decision, so long its outcome "was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds."' 6 3 "[Ainy reading beyond the narrowest reasonable reading of [applicable] precedent ... can readily be viewed as a 'new rule.' "164 This broad understanding of eligible new rules is reinforced by the Court's parsimonious reading of Teague's two exceptions. The first concerned new rules that placed "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe."' 65 This falls within the well-established doc-trine that decisions narrowing the scope of criminal liability should be fully retroactive. 166 Therefore, a court recently held that it was proper to reconsider a final unappealed conviction for gun possession after the Supreme Court found the relevant statute unconstitutional. 167 This exception also allows collateral review when a court reinterprets a criminal statute to exclude a petitioner's conduct.' 6 8
The second exception permits a habeas court to review an otherwise final conviction if it were obtained in violation of a laterformulated "watershed rule[ I] of criminal procedure," non-observance of which would result in "the likelihood of an accurate conviction [being] seriously diminished."' 6 9 This exception has turned out to be extremely limited in practice. Such a rule must "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding."°7 0 The Court had already recognized that the great bulk of the new procedures mandated in the rights revolution of the 1960s did not measurably enhance the truth-finding aspects of a criminal prosecution. They were aimed only at deterring unconstitutional police or prosecutorial misconduct. 1 7 ' The Supreme Court has, in fact, identified only one case whose rule would satisfy this criterion-Gideon v. Wainwright, 7 2 which mandated legal representation at public expense for indigent defendants.
7 3 The Court has declined, on the other hand, to allow a death-row prisoner to challenge his execution collaterally based on a Supreme Court judgment-announced after his sentence holding that an aggravating factor essential to impose the death penalty must be determined by the jury and not the judge.' 7 4
In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. (AEDPA)] "7 It restricted the right of state court defendants to challenge their convictions by collateral review in federal court, creating, among other requirements, strict time limits. It also specified that, if a particular claim had been "adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings," a federal court could not issue a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court The Act and the Court's doctrine are not, however, precisely congruent. For example, the "new rule" that may not be relied on for habeas relief under Teague is one announced after the petitioner's case became final.' 78 But the "clearly established Federal law" to which a state court decision might conform to bar such relief under the statute is that existing at the time of the relevant decision, even if the law was changed before the conviction became final-so that it might have been properly applied in reviewing the decision under Griffith and Teague.' 7 9 Both sets of limitations-of Teague and of the Act-must be overcome before a federal district court may grant a habeas petition.' 8 0
The foregoing discussion concerns only the limits of retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure in collateral review of state criminal convictions in federal courts. State law also typically allows collateral attacks on convictions even after direct review is no longer available. State courts are free to apply new rules of criminal procedure on such review, even if a federal court could not.'"' State courts, in fact, apply a range of approaches when deciding whether to apply such law. 
IV. THE PROBLEMS OF PROSPECTIVE ADJUDICATION
As this summary indicates, the history and current status of the once widely accepted idea that judicial pronouncements of law are thoroughly retroactive are complicated and obscure. At present, for civil cases, most state courts applying state law examine the relevant factors favoring or disfavoring prospective application on a case-bycase basis. All courts must apply new rules of federal law to all cases still pending on direct review at the time that the rule is declared. Almost all courts find a way to apply a judicially-narrowed rule of criminal liability retroactively but refuse to do the same when the scope of liability has been broadened. The United States Supreme Court, after a period when it made some new constitutional rules of criminal procedure selectively prospective, has now settled on a "firm rule of retroactivity," 1 4 binding all courts. This retroactivity, however, reaches back only to cases in which direct appeals remain available. Collateral attack of a conviction based on a subsequently announced procedural rule is permitted in federal courts only within the narrow exceptions defined in Teague v. Lane and the AEDPA' 1s 5 State courts collaterally reviewing a judgment are not bound by Teague or the AEDPA and apply a variety of approaches. These divergent standards show that the retroactivity and prospectivity of judicially-created law remains profoundly controversial in American jurisprudence.
The disagreement has often been expressed in terms of the practice's relation to the doctrine of stare decisis. The declaration of a genuinely new rule is, by definition, a break with the discipline of stare decisis. Still, its advocates have argued that prospective overruling is supported by that doctrine's principal purposes. "By not applying a law-changing decision retroactively, a court respects the settled expectations that have built up around the old law."' 8 6 This argument, however, turns out to be two-edged sword. The very capacity of a prospective ruling to accommodate justified reliance may remove one of the greatest incentives to adhere to precedent:
By announcing new rules prospectively or by applying them selectively, a court may dodge the stare decisis bullet by avoiding the disruption of settled expectations that otherwise prevents us from disturbing our settled precedents. Because it forces us to consider the disruption that our new decisional rules cause, retroactivity combines with stare decisis to prevent us from altering the law each time the opportunity presents itself.' was a position with which it was difficult to argue and it undermined the claim that non-retroactivity was somehow inconsistent with the nature of adjudication. 196 To the extent that the practice of giving judgments only prospective effect reflects modern recognition of the law-making power of judges, we might expect it to be employed differently depending on the underlying source of the law being applied. The demise of the declaratory theory led first to the conclusion that the judicial creation and modification of common law rules were inevitably exercises of judicial legislation. The idea that enacted law does not pre-exist judicial cases invoking it, however, is markedly harder to sustain. It might follow that courts could limit the applicability in time of their common law judgments but not those bottomed on statutes or constitutions. 197 A few cases support this intuition. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that "[wihere a decision does not announce new common-law rules or rights but rather construes a statute, no analysis of retroactive or prospective effect is required because at issue is the meaning of the statute since its enactment." 98 For the most part, however, neither courts nor commentators have regarded the source of the law at issue as of much consequence to the temporal effect of a judgment. Cardozo thought there was no "adequate distinction" between changes of rulings concerning statutes or common law."' 99 Likewise, when he wrote the Supreme Court's Sunburst opinion, upholding the constitutionality of prospective overruling by state courts, he noted that the "alternative is the same whether the subject of the new decision is common law or statute." 20 0
In fact, some observers have noted that prospective rulings have been more common in the case of new statutory interpretations than in the case of new common law rules. 20 1 The justification for such a priority has never been thoroughly explained. In Sunburst, Justice Cardozo assumed that the decision to apply judgments retroactively or prospectively-in whatever kind of case-was an aspect of the doctrine of stare decisis, that doctrine itself was a part of the common law, and, therefore, it was within the authority of the judges. 20 2 One writer has suggested that individuals are more likely to rely on statutory or constitutional rights than common law rights and are therefore entitled to a greater degree of protection. 20 3 A recent decision of the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal addressed the "seemingly compelling" argument that a state court was without power to treat a statutory interpretation as anything but fully retroactive. The court noted that legislatures often write broad statutes, relying on courts to refine and apply them. "[Tihe judicial development of the legislatively-created concept is little different from the development of judicially-announced law" so a court could properly consider whether its interpretation should applied retroactively. 20 4 In sum, the current confused state of the law on the possibility of limited retroactivity of judgments demonstrates a persistent and possibly irresoluble tension in the American view of law and of the roles of legal institutions. The separation of powers, a fundamental dogma of the constitutional system, assumes that we are able to identify with some confidence what distinguishes "legislative" from "judicial" functions. 20 5 The declaratory view of adjudication fit comfortably with that assumption. But that view, that the content of the law exists prior to and independent of its application by the courts, now seems irretrievably lost. Even with respect to written law, modern notions of interpretation have blurred the line between legislation and adjudication. 20 6 In these circumstances, what can it mean to complain that a prospective-only ruling is inconsistent with the judicial role? The difficulty is illustrated in one of Justice Scalia's separate opinions in the Supreme Court's series of cases effecting the transition from limited retroactivity to a "firm rule of retroactivity":207 I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense "make" law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they were "finding" it-discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be. 20 In his separate opinion in the case, Justice White pounced on this obscure description of the proper role of courts:
[Eiven though the Justice is not naive enough (nor does he think the Framers were naive enough) to be unaware that judges in a real sense "make" law, he suggests that judges (in an unreal sense, I suppose) should never concede that they do and must claim that they do no more than discover it, hence suggesting that there are citizens who are naive enough to believe them. 20 9 There is no more contested issue in American law than the propriety of independent policy-making by courts.
2 10 Prospective judgments dramatically spotlight that controversy. It is not surprising that this has been a difficult and contentious issue for courts and commentators alike. It will be impossible to arrive at a coherent and generally accepted approach to the retroactive or prospective application of new judicial declarations of law until there is an equally well accepted definition of the proper allocation of lawmaking authority. 
